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There is an overwhelming consensus that climate change is a reality that requires urgent attention through 
mitigation and adaptation strategies. A slow rise in aggregate funding and investment towards projects which 
incorporate adaptation with respect to the consequences of climate change or mitigation of the known causes 
of climate change has occurred globally. This illustrates the increased intention of the public and private 
sectors to find appropriate interventions which work towards the lowering of carbon emissions or finding ways 
for the public to adapt their current behaviour to the eminent changes of climate. In this report, we present a 
critical review of literature on climate change financing. The review engages the meaning, sources and 
monitoring of the flow of climate finance. We also present discourses on issues related to the evaluation of 
the social impacts of climate finance on intended beneficiaries. These debates are contextualised in 
eThekwini Municipality’s approach to climate change adaption and mitigation. We note that there are many 
concerns regarding climate change finance that require further attention. These issues range from whether 
or not climate finance should form part of official development assistance (ODA), how funds should be 
distributed and who should climate change initiatives benefit. These issues could hamper the implementation 
of many useful strategies and much needed finance could end up funding projects that are not for public 
benefit. Furthermore, there is a conspicuous absence of appropriate and standard criteria for projects to meet 
in order to qualify as a climate change initiative. The lack of explicit requirements for projects to provide co-
benefits to communities remains an unsettling problem and allows for substantial room for funding of 
unsuitable and in some cases, non-existent climate change projects. Much work still needs to be done to 
setup the identification criteria and measurement frameworks to help with issues of transparency, 
accountability and tracking of climate finance. This is especially needed in developing countries in order to 
curtail the misuse of climate funds in all tiers of government. There is also an urgent need to create a system 
that will govern, prescribe and monitor the use of climate funds for the betterment of the eco-systems, non –








As the world becomes increasingly concerned about climate change and associated impacts on human and 
environmental health, climate change mitigation and adaptation strategies have become a priority for various 
stakeholders. To the detriment of the global South, much of the cost and consequences of unfolding climate 
change are expected to differentially affect populations, eco-systems, built environments and nature in the 
South. Meanwhile, current approaches to climate change mitigation and adaptation are premised on 
considerable financial investment which is mostly expected to flow from the global North to developing 
countries based in the global South. In this report, we present a critical review of literature on climate change 
financing. The review engages the meaning, sources and monitoring of the flow of climate finance. We also 
present discourses on issues related to the evaluation of the social impacts of climate finance on intended 
projects and ultimately its beneficiaries. These debates are contextualised in eThekwini Municipality’s 
approach to climate change adaptation and mitigation.  
 
1. Problematising Climate Change Finance 
The United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) of 1994 was the first formal 
agreement that acknowledged that climate change is a concern for humankind. To address challenges 
associated with climate change, the UNFCCC notes that it is quintessential for all parties to work collectively 
to gather and share information, policies and strategies on greenhouse gas emissions (GHG) in order to 
simultaneously mitigate and adapt to changing climatic conditions (Lattanzio, 2014). Realising the objectives 
of climate change mitigation and adaptation is premised on urgent financial commitment. However, the 
meaning of climate finance is fraught with conceptual ambiguity (Westphal et al., 2015; Bracking, 2015b). 
This is evident in multiple definitions of climate finance that abound in the literature. The conceptual ambiguity 
presents a number of challenges and numerous questions in relation to transparency, accuracy and how 
climate finance is allocated, measured and verified (UNFCCC, 2014a).  
 
In their working paper on climate finance, Westphal et al., (2015:5) observe that there is no agreement on 
whether measurement of climate finance should be “based on gross or net flows”. While gross flows refers 
to “the total amount of private finance, offset finance, and non-concessional lending from multilateral 
development banks (MDBs),” net flows is “the grant equivalent transfers from developed countries and the 
net benefit to the developing countries for non-concessional public and private flows” (ibid). A lack of this 
distinction implies that stakeholders cannot accurately determine what actually constitute climate finance.  
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Another concern regarding climate finance relates to the view of what constitutes “private climate finance” 
(which accounts for 50-60% of total international climate funding); a view point which is often blurred (Clapp 
et al., 2012). For instance, what is presently considered as private finance are often made up of funds from 
routine investment decisions by private companies and policies that have been placed on the energy markets. 
Such funds, although they might have indirect bearing on climate change, are not explicitly dedicated to 
climate change. Bracking (2015a:2343) cites an example of a clean development mechanism fund in South 
Africa that “was provided to the Tongaat Hulett Fuel Switching Project, to reduce unpleasant smells, when 
this too is covered by section 35 of the Air Quality Act 2004”. What this implies is that the current model of 
climate finance encourages commercial profitability without empirical evidence to demonstrate additional 
mitigating/adaptation benefits beyond what these companies are already mandated to implement by existing 
environmental laws. The implication of this is that anything that can be packaged as ‘green’ stands the chance 
of being funded. This amorphous circumstance and non-fixity of a definition of climate finance in the public 
sector is mirrored by the lack of international standards governing Green Bonds in the private sector 
(Bracking, 2015a). 
 
As a way to embrace various sources of funding, and also perhaps inadvertently to further perpetuate 
conceptual ambiguity, the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (2014a) broadly 
defines climate finance as “local, national or transnational financing, which may be drawn from public, private 
and alternative sources of financing”. Rather than address the problem of conceptual ambiguity, there remain 
challenges associated with the choice of this definition as evident in the non-endorsement of the definition 
by parties to the UNFCCC (Westphal et al., 2015). While a broader definition has an aspirational intent and 
potential ability to attract sources of finance whose owners anticipate a multiplier effect from the association 
with climate finance, or more generally the ‘green economy’, it also confounds attempts to fix the definition 
sufficiently to enable litigable actions when finance spent in respect of the objectives of climate change 
mitigation and adaptation fail to objectively perform that function. The requirement of ‘evidenced-based’ 
expenditures under the category are potentially confounded by fungible switching between amorphous 
spending activities and objectives.  
 
Besides the lack of clarity and agreement on the climate finance concept, there is also an imbalance in project 
funding between climate mitigation and climate adaptation initiatives. What is also striking is the fact that 
climate finance globally funds many more mitigation strategies, mostly in renewable energy and the 
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accelerating move away from fossil fuels, than it does adaptation strategies by a varying but large proportion 
(Climate Policy Initiative, 2015). This is contrary to an emerging view that climate finance should be shared 
equally between mitigation and adaptation which was written into the founding documentation of the Green 
Climate Fund, a central institution of global efforts to avert the consequences of the unfolding climate crisis 
(Bracking, 2015b; Buchner et al, 2011). The figure below outlines the skewed nature of investment in climate 
adaptation and mitigation. The dedication of a disproportionately high proportion of climate finance towards 
mitigation implies that very little is left to fund climate change adaptation projects. This lack of funding in 
adaptation can and does worsen the socio-economic conditions of the poor and vulnerable who often bear 
the brunt of climate change. 
 
Figure 1: Total Contributions by Mitigation, Adaptation or Unspecified ($ USD millions) 
 
Source: UNFCCC (2014b) 
 
Added to the foregoing is a mismatch in areas of priority between academic research and policy makers on 
climate change. While academics may prioritise mitigation/adaptation strategies over economic development, 
policy makers may focus on development first and mitigation/adaption afterwards (Rennkamp, 2013). This 
can cause friction within the working relationship between the academia and policy makers. This is a matter 
of concern that requires urgent intervention since a multi-sectorial and multi-institutional approach is critical 




Authors have stressed that in order to effectively manage the issue of climate change, there has to be strong 
coordination between national, provincial and local governments and between NGOs, academia and 
communities (Holgate, 2007). However, the financialisation of the climate change policy and practice agenda 
have resulted in what can best be described as an ‘elite capture’ of climate change decision making 
apparatus. Financialising climate change is fraught with multiple challenges most of which are systemic. 
According to Bracking (2014), a financialised approach to addressing climate change is woefully insufficient. 
Bracking (2014:43) argues that “at best, financialised policy produces a spectacle or illusion of care, a 
globalised narrative which is embedded and generated within traditional supranational institutions and new 
institutional architecture such as the Green Climate Fund”. Essentially, the global carbon market has become 
subject to elite capture with little evidence that this is providing the intended benefits for the environment, the 
poor and vulnerable. The financialisation of climate change is underpinned by market-based philosophy with 
a neo-liberal orientation despite evidence to the contrary that the market lacks commitment to addressing 
climate change (Bond, 2015). Added to this is the lack of critical insights into scenarios about possible future 
crises in the financialised international climate market, likely to be similar to those that have punctuated the 
international economic system. The dearth of insights in this regard implies that the international climate 
finance market is not prepared to cope with possible future crises.  
 
In addition to the foregoing is a lack of critical discussion and empirical evidence to support the notion that 
the current global financialised system of providing climate finance for mitigation and adaptation is leading to 
a cleaner ecosystem (Bracking, 2015c). Despite this, the international community continues to pursue this 
trajectory with singular mindedness which gives the impression that it is the only path to achieving a cleaner 
global future. The financialisation of climate change without commitment to changing current patterns of GHG 
and proactive commitments to climate change mitigation is simply a farce masquerading as the only 
alternative to solving climate change. In fact, the current trajectory might be obstructing the kind of proactive 
steps both in terms of investment in cleaner energy alternatives and GHG abatements required for a secure 
cleaner global future (Bracking, 2015a). Many eminent scientists and international bodies are pointing to the 
insufficiency of current global agreements in the face of worse than expected warming figures over the last 
two decades (UNEP, 2011), with the consensus that even the recently signed Paris Agreement is insufficient 





The international climate finance system is also characterised by limited growth in the funding that is required 
to meet mitigation and adaptation targets for a sustainable future. The foregoing presents a compelling basis 
to argue for the reconceptualisation of the Green Economy. Bracking (2015c:40) advocates a different 
paradigm that is underpinned by “a practice of democratic government which can act on science and peoples’ 
needs at a national and international level…. to assist communities to live differently; and ask which demands 
a peoples’ based political movement to make it happen”. Wainwright and Mann (2013) recently termed what 
is required a ‘climate x’, the formation of a new global climate Leviathan, or political order, made necessary, 
but by no means inevitable, by the demands of managing climate change. Meanwhile, from political economy, 
Castee and Christophers (2015) also respond to the challenge of scale in relation to the problem of climate 
change, by suggesting that a massive capital switch of credit money into green infrastructure is required, and 
provide cautious sources of optimism that this might be possible.  
 
These authors, and many others, share the premise that humans are facing a global challenge of mighty 
proportions that requires socio-economic and political, as much as energy system and natural science, 
responses. This approach is contrary to current dominant financialised paradigms in which developed 
countries and dirty companies can continue on their destructive path of GHG emissions as long as they invest 
in the carbon market for offsetting certified emissions reductions (CERs). Effectively, financialisation of 
climate change allows industrialised countries and large corporations to continue emitting GHG 
comparatively guilt-free since they can afford carbon credits. 
 
This critique notwithstanding, interesting changes to policy and response in the cities of the Global South are 
occurring, despite rather than because of the global scale of negotiations. These are best described as an 
emerging system of correlation, a locally situated ‘dispositif’ in the Foucauldian tradition (see Braun, 2014: 
50-51; citing Foucault, 1980: 194). As Braun recently summarised,  
 
“In the face of climate change, what we see is that the administration of life – biopolitics – is itself changing, not 
only combining diverse elements into new heterogeneous formations, but also taking hold of new knowledge, 
technologies, and practices that either did not previously exist or had not previously been appropriated as a means 




The range of climate change adaptation and poverty reduction projects analysed in this paper illustrate this 
active remaking space of entraining, morphing and creating of new governance practices and understandings 
in eThekwini.  
 
2. Sources of Climate Change Finance 
The dominant paradigm in current approaches to climate mitigation and adaptation is one that is underpinned 
by considerable financial commitments. The paradigm is hinged on the notion that significant financial 
investment is required to offset GHG emission and help communities adapt to the imperatives of climate 
change. Climate finance is intended to assist developing countries reduce their GHG emissions and adapt to 
changing climatic conditions (UNFCCC, 2014a). Climate finance is realised through mechanisms like the 
Green Climate Fund (GCF). The GCF is an agreement within the UNFCCC to assist developing countries’ 
adaptation and mitigation of climate change (Bracking, 2015c). Instruments for governing the GCF were 
initially planned by the Conference of Parties 17 (COP17) in Durban and then passed through a number of 
years of refining and iteration to date.  
 
A study by the World Bank (2011) estimates that the predicted cost of climate adaptation is/will be between 
$70 billion to $100 billion USD per year between 2010 and 2050. However, the actual cost to the poor is still 
to be determined. To actualise climate change financing, developed countries would need to agree in 
financing the bulk of climate change initiatives. Under the GCF agreement, parties to the UNFCCC committed 
to contributing $100 billion USD per annum by 2020 (Westphal et al., 2015). Although developed countries 
committed significant funds to climate finance in the “fast-start finance period,” there is no consensus on 
whether the targeted $100 billion USD is in addition to existing contributions or should be new finance 
(Westphal et al., 2015). In addition to this, there is no agreement on the proportions of national budgets that 
developed countries should commit to climate finance. Against this backdrop, how much a country commits 
to climate finance is often a subjective decision of contributing countries. Added to this is that fiscal policies 
in advanced economies such as the implementation of austerity measures in light of continuing and growing 
economic uncertainties will affect their ability to meet the set target.  
 
The UNFCCC (2014) Biennial Assessment report indicates that global climate finance ranges from $340 
million to $650 million USD per annum. Finance flows from developed to developing countries ranging from 
$40 to $175 million USD per annum. Below is a table illustrating these flows. However, a concern surrounding 
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climate finance is the lack of agreement as to how to fit it into existing development finance assistance 
classifications, and/or whether it should fit in at all. Whether other sources besides public funding should also 
contribute to the fund is also unclear. 
 
Table 1. Estimated volume of mitigation and adaptation finance ($USD million and in percent 2009-2010) 
Source  Total  
(USD m)  
Adaptation (%)  Mitigation (%)  Adaptation 
(USD m)  
Mitigation  
(USD m)  
Bilateral  22,767  16    84 3,641  19,127  
Multilateral  14,361    3    97    475  13,886  
Funds    2,492    3    97      65    2,428  
Offsets* 1   2,250    0  100        0    2,250  
Philanthropy*2      450  47    53    210       240  
Private finance  54,600    0 100        0  54,600  
Total  96,920    5%    95% 4,390  92,531  
Source: Source: Climate Policy Initiative (CPI)  
*Mid-point of estimates where ranges exist.  
 
Furthermore, it is unclear how climate financial assistance will be delivered to developing countries. 
Arguments on the nature of climate finance have coalesced into two diametrically opposed stances: whether 
climate finance should be in the form of grants or in the form of loans to developing countries. The dominant 
view among developing countries as well as civil society organisations (CSOs) is that climate finance should 
be in the form of grants. South Africa belongs to the G77+ China and the Africa group who believe that: 
 
“developed country parties should provide substantial, new, additional, adequate, predictable 
and sustained public funding additional to and different from the official development assistance 
(ODA) to meet the agreed full costs and/or incremental costs incurred by developing country 
Parties to effectively implement their commitments under the Convention, taking into 
consideration that other sources of finance like the private sector and carbon market can play a 
supplementary role” (Africa Group, 2009:3). 
 
Contrary to the above stance, existing funding approaches indicate that climate finance is not limited to 
donations from developed countries. Westphal et al., (2015:5) note that funds such as “concessional and 
non-concessional loans, as well as capital contributions, guarantees, and insurance as climate finance” have 
all been construed by source countries as climate finance. This is contrary to the view that climate finance 
                                                          
1 * The Adaptation Fund is covered under the ‘Funds’ category and not under carbon offset flows.  




should not be in the form of loans. The argument is that providing climate finance in the form of a loan could 
potentially worsen the dire financial constraints of developing countries that are negatively affected by the 
imperatives of climate change. 
 
How climate change finance is classified also has serious implications on who receives it and how they may 
use it. Developing countries perceive climate finance as restitution between sovereign states. Therefore, 
recipient states should be allowed to use the funding in any manner they see fit. This is an area of serious 
contention. Disagreements on how climate finance should be spent do not only exist at the international level; 
they also exist at the national level (Persson & Remling, 2014). There are those who prefer that it be 
redistributed to the most vulnerable, while others contend that it be used to pursue investments that have 
high social benefits (Persson & Remling, 2014).  
 
Disagreement on what constitutes climate finance has created debates as to whether climate finance should 
be provided through existing or new institutions. Developed countries prefer existing institutions that they 
have been leading to oversee climate finance, while developing countries prefer new institutions created 
specifically for managing climate finance. Developing countries are weary of existing international financial 
institutions as they have not been functioning in their favour and have failed to provide proper support for 
sustainable development and poverty alleviation (Ballesteros et al., 2010). Evidence supports the notion that 
existing institutional models in climate finance advance the financial interests of established 
institutions/businesses. Bracking (2015c:35) notes this point alluding to the emergence (in respect of the 
GCF):  
 
“of a ‘fund-of-funds’ institution; a largely mitigation based expenditure model; using private 
sector-oriented results and evaluation technologies that allow fictive and dirty energy subsidies 
to predominate; of offshore, equity fund managers promoted to decision-makers over portfolio 
expenditures, combined with multilateral entities as gatekeepers and compradors, who will likely 
use the same offshore intermediaries down the funding pipeline as would the private sector to 
begin with.” 
 
The hegemonic interests at the international level leave little room for negotiations in relation to climate 
change mitigation and adaptation. In Bracking’s (2015b) view, this hegemonic vested interest group 
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continues to be a key hindrance to the adoption of new energy alternatives since a new approach will 
challenge the status quo and thus disadvantage those that benefit from it. Against the backdrop of the 
foregoing concerns, it is important that whichever institution(s) are used for distribution be seen as legitimate 
and effective by all parties.  
 
3.  Climate Change Co-Benefits 
Following from the ambiguous nature of climate finance terminology and how the funds should be used and 
managed, the absence of clarity as to what qualifies as a co-benefit in climate change finance remains 
another unresolved issue (Tompkins & Eakin, 2011; Aakre & Rubbelke, 2010). This ambiguity causes a great 
challenge in distinguishing which projects are suitable or appropriate to be listed as a ‘climate change project’ 
and thereby qualify for climate change adaptation or mitigation financial incentives. Co-benefits have been 
defined as “the additional and locally desirable developmental benefits of climate actions” (Zusman, 2008: 
88). Co-benefits are normally expected to be socio-economic in nature. For example, poverty reduction co-
benefits make a case for social value found in ecological changes and interventions. Climate change 
adaptation projects have the potential of contributing to a multitude of poverty reduction activities such as 
urban food security, income generation and job creation. These effects, however, have not been 
systematically evaluated, nor has a set of criteria been established as what activities can be categorised 
thus.  “Poverty reduction co-benefit” is a concept being used to better understand the socio-economic 
changes in climate change projects particularly targeting disadvantaged and vulnerable peoples.  
 
Co-benefits can be calculated as the costs avoided if alternative policies other than climate 
mitigation/adaptation policies were adopted such as the costs of avoiding premature deaths in extreme 
weather conditions (Bollen et al., 2009). The extent to which co-benefits of climate mitigation policies offer 
economic incentives for countries usually depends on the two following factors: 
 
1. The extent to which co-benefits are seen as important. Mitigation has been calculated to be beneficial 
until 2050 when the benefits of air pollution are large enough to compensate for the Gross Domestic 
Product (GDP) loss from adopting GHG mitigation policies. It was however not found to be as 
economically beneficial to choose climate mitigation policies after the year 2050 because the benefits 
decrease drastically and thereby countries may lose interest in climate change interventions (Bollen 
et al., 2009). 
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2. It is important to consider the cost of achieving the same level of reduction of local air pollution 
through direct policies compared to the indirect policies that may be associated with co-benefits. 
Therefore direct policies can be considered as co-benefits if they are cheaper than indirect policies 
(Bollen et al., 2009).  
 
Besides precise classification of climate change finance, very little attention has been dedicated to who ought 
to benefit from such funding in the literature. The key question revolves around whether only projects with a 
public co-benefit should be funded. There is the egalitarian view which states that there should be equal 
funding opportunities for all eligible states/beneficiaries without taking into consideration their level of 
vulnerability. This approach has been criticised because it advocates for equal per capita funding for 
state/beneficiaries and projects even when there are socio-economic variations in population and among 
project beneficiaries (Ratajczak-Juszko & Feaver, 2011). An approach that emphasises equality may 
undermine equity of benefits if pre-existing conditions of vulnerability and levels of well-being are not taken 
into consideration. However, the view that advances the notion that funding should be proportional to the 
level of vulnerability (see Fussel et al., 2012; Grasso, 2010; Stadelmann et al., 2014) has also been criticised 
on the basis that it is difficult to measure vulnerability. It has been argued that indicators that have been 
suggested for measuring vulnerability are normative, misguided and are best suited for measuring symptoms 
rather than actual causes of vulnerability (Persson & Remling, 2014). Since there has been no agreement or 
clarity as to what type of projects the GCF should fund, there have been suggestions that the types of projects 
that have been seen as successful can be used as exemplars for other projects. Projects that have been 
successful share the following attributes (Friends of the Earth & Institute for Policy Studies, 2015):  
 
1. Projects that were identified as successful responded to community-identified needs with climate 
action that was community driven i.e. initiated, developed, implemented and monitored by the 
community.  
2. They have engaged with broad networks that have deep and local roots. 
3. They have built relationships of trust within the community as well as between the community, 
government, civil society, financiers and academia and with community members in leadership roles 
and as project promoters.  




5. They have built capacity using local institutions. Local capacity needs to be built by creating new 
institutions that are run by the community, including supporting the communities with a range of skill 
and capacity building and training, including activities that support the development of the local 
workforce, enterprises, and supply chains. 
6.  Local knowledge, tools and methods was adapted and used. 
7. They did not impose external ideas on to the local community. Outside ideas were not imposed 
on the communities, solutions were rather tailored to the context of the community to ensure that the 
end user needs were for broader development met. 
8. They engaged with local governance and regulatory authorities prior to implementation of projects. 
They took local governance models into account and ensured buy-in and co-operation of local 
governing bodies and regulatory authorities prior to implementation. 
9. Appropriate policies were put in place; they had long term benefits such as social and technical 
sustainability. Having appropriate enabling policies and regulatory frameworks in place are essential 
for long-term financial, social and technical sustainability. Such frameworks are critical to drawing in 
finance. Investing modestly in policy and institutional reform, supported by political will, may have 
significant multiplier effects. Policies are needed to remove market, institutional, financial, technology 
and social barriers that were inhibiting commercially viable investments. This will increase investment 
over time. 
10. Solutions were tailored to the local context to ensure that they meet the users’ needs for broader 
development. 
11. The rights of the poor were recognised and respected especially rights to the control over resources 
such as land, water and forests.  
12. Gender issues were taken into consideration.  
13. Projects were aimed at supplying multiple co-benefits such as electricity, clean water, new skills and 
capital/financial wealth. Such benefits stayed with the community.  
14.  Decision making structures included the public. Processes were transparent throughout and had 
multi stake holder participation throughout.  
15. Most of these projects were small in scale (less than $50 million USD).  
16. These projects were partially or wholly funded by grants and allowed for flexibility, experimentation 
and innovation.     
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The above successful project co-benefits are noble in ensuring that social justice and equity are heavily 
weighed out within a project.   
 
Additional criteria that have been suggested for determining which projects should be funded are: 
effectiveness; robustness; investment sustainability; transparency; accountability; participation; multiplier 
effects and learning potential (Persson & Remling, 2014). Although regional co-benefits have been taken into 
account, there is no requirement for regional or global social benefits in funding applications (Persson & 
Remling, 2014). Applicants are only required to include information on potential beneficiaries, but they are 
not expected to estimate the number of beneficiaries or even their characteristics when applying for funding 
(Persson & Remling, 2014). This is unfortunate because a better understanding of potential beneficiaries 
would clarify whether there is public benefit or private benefit or both.  
 
4. Transparency and Accountability in Climate Finance 
Climate finance is characterised by a number of transparency and accountability issues including the 
absence of core performance indicators and results management frameworks (Lattanzio, 2014). Without 
performance indicators, it becomes difficult to measure if a climate change adaptation/mitigation project is 
performing/underperforming. Developing countries currently have no experience in tracking and monitoring 
climate change-related financial flows since this is the first time that they have been required to do so. This 
means that they will not have kept useful records for the eventual evaluation of climate change projects and 
it will take time for countries to develop the capacity to carry out such activities (Montmasson-Clair, 2013).  
 
There is also a lack of clarity on what happens if projects do not achieve intended objectives (Ballesteros et 
al., 2010). Presently, there are no clearly stated penalties for failure to meet project objectives.  It is important 
to design monitoring or evaluative system to measure, report and verify (MRV) climate finance. However, 
there is no MRV support framework at the international level because definitions are still an issue of debate 
(Berliner et al., 2013). It has been recommended that MRV should take place on three levels: international, 
national and project levels respectively. Berliner et al. (2013) suggest that rather than requiring countries to 
provide information on spending, they should be provided with support and reporting skills/tools to avoid 
burdening recipients with complicated reporting systems. MRV applies to both to those that are receiving and 
those contributing to climate finance. Contributors will be interested in whether their contributions are being 




The determination to deliver clear and appropriate definitions for climate change financing and to balance 
out the weight of climate mitigation with adaptation projects will ultimately help to provide transparency and 
accountability to projects. This will increase the capacity of global funding to support the plight of climate 
disasters which occur in developing countries located in the global South. Lack of data on climate change 
projects has made it difficult to determine how much climate finance is funding projects termed ‘climate 
change projects’ in developing countries. An implication of this is that many projects that are funded may go 
unaccounted for. In addition, projects that may not necessarily be climate change projects may qualify for 
funding due to the lack of clarity on what qualifies as a climate change project. There is also a risk of double 
counting since there is no guidance as to how climate finance should be counted both nationally and globally. 
Bracking (2015a: 2343) illustrated the consequences of this non-fixity in the case study of the South African 
Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) projects that: “the ongoing lack of public data and company 
monitoring reports available at the DNA [Designated National Authority] also suggests that the status of CDM 
[clean development mechanism] approvals lacks transparent oversight”. Bracking (2015c: 35) further argued 
of the GCF framework that “investment decisions remain ring-fenced in the private sector facility, or 
answerable only to overarching targets and goals in the investment framework and its (eventual) derivative 
investment contracts which will be required to be loosely referenced to the priority areas”. Without the 
oversight of stakeholders on how climate finance related decisions are made and how these are 
implemented, the transparency of investments in climate change initiatives remains problematic.  
 
To provide effective climate adaptation/mitigation strategies, it is pertinent to have a better understanding of 
the actual costs and benefits of these strategies. These are called the “economics of adaptation” (Doczi & 
Ross, 2014). The African Development Bank (AfDB) estimated that the average cost of African adaptation 
strategies is between $20-30 billion USD in 2011 in addition to existing development needs. This may seem 
expensive, but long-term benefits are likely to outweigh short-term costs thus justifying such spending.  It has 
also been noted that, it is difficult to estimate ecosystem conservation and relocation as well as social 
adaptation costs. Consequently, such costs may not be adequately represented in cost estimates (Doczi & 
Ross, 2014). 
 
Risk reduction strategies need to be integrated into the development of climate finance strategies. Knowledge 
about impacts and vulnerability regarding climate change should translate into policy (Department of 
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Agriculture, Forestry & Fisheries, 2012). Having appropriate and enabling policies and regulatory frameworks 
in place are essential for long-term financial, social and technical sustainability of climate change mitigation 
and adaptation. Such frameworks are critical to accessing climate change finance. Investing modestly in 
policy and institutional reform, supported by political will, may have significant multiplier effects. Policies are 
needed to remove market, institutional, financial, technology and social barriers inhibiting commercially viable 
investments in climate change finance (Institute for Policy Studies, 2015). 
  
5. Efforts by the South African government in Climate Change Mitigation and 
Adaptation 
South Africa is amongst one of the largest GHG emitters in the world (Montmasson-Clair, 2013) despite being 
highly vulnerable to climate change. Recognising the urgent need to mitigate climate change, the South 
African government has taken proactive steps in reducing its carbon footprints. Current initiatives in place to 
curb GHG emissions include the Renewable Energy Independent Power Producer Procurement Programme 
and the Carbon Tax initiative. In addition to these, the country aims to upscale existing climate change 
mitigation projects including:  
 
1. Working for Water (WfW) and Working on Fire estimated at $1.2 billion USD per year.  
2. Working on Wetlands estimated at $0.12 billion USD per year.  
3. Water Conservation and Demand Management estimated at $5.3 billion USD per year.  
4. Land restoration estimated at $0.07 billion USD per year.  
Source:  UNFCCC (2015: 9) 
 
In its intended nationally determined contribution (INDC) to COP21 held in Paris in 2015, South Africa 
committed to climate change mitigation and adaptation through the implementation of various policy options. 
The INDC emphasised the importance of transforming South Africa’s pattern of energy generation, distribution 
and consumption in order to attain the objective of a low carbon future. This entails deriving the country’s 
energy from both renewable and non-renewable sources as well as improving the efficiency of its energy 
infrastructure by replacing “an inefficient fleet of ageing coal-fired power plants with clean and high efficiency 
technology going forward” (UNFCCC, 2015:2). In the INDC, South Africa’s commitment to climate change 
adaptation revolves around six goals (UNFCCC, 2015:3-6): 
 
1. Develop a National Adaptation Plan, and begin operationalisation as part of implementing the 
National Climate Change Response Policy for the period from 2020 to 2025 and for the period 2025 




2. Take into account climate considerations in national development, sub-national and sector policy 
frameworks for the period 2020 to 2030.  
 
3. Build the necessary institutional capacity for climate change response planning and implementation 
for the period 2020 to 2030.  
 
4. Develop an early warning, vulnerability and adaptation monitoring system for key climate vulnerable 
sectors and geographic areas for the period 2020 to 2030, and reporting in terms of the National 
Adaptation Plan with rolling five-year implementation periods.  
 
5. Development of a vulnerability assessment and adaptation needs framework by 2020 to support a 
continuous presentation of adaptation needs.  
 
6. Communication of past investments in adaptation for education and awareness as well as for 
international recognition.  
 
 
The South African government has realised that international and corporate financiers are critical to providing 
financial backing for climate change adaptation and mitigation projects. This recognition is evident in the 
National Climate Response Green (25th November 2010) and White (13th October 2011) papers which 
emphasised the need to allow various institutions to contribute to climate change finance (Department of 
Environmental Affairs, 2010, 2011). The Green Paper aims to establish the National Climate Change Fund 
that would source international and national finance for mitigation and adaptation as well as a Climate 
Finance Tracking Facility that would track public and private climate finance flows (Department of 
Environmental Affairs, 2010). The public sector will offer support through public procurement programmes 
while development finance institutions will incorporate climate change objectives in their planning and 
portfolios (Montmasson-Clair, 2013). In 2011, South Africa launched a South African Renewables initiative 
aimed at providing a channel for international public finance into the development of renewables capacity 
and the delivery of green energy. The collaboration included United Kingdom, Norway, German, Denmark 
and the European Investment Bank (Montmasson-Clair, 2013). 
 
The climate change strategy is formulated with the leadership of the National Treasury (NT), the Economic 
Development Department (EDD) and the Department of Environmental Affairs (DEA). These departments 
are tasked to develop climate finance strategies and architecture for South Africa. Research by the 
Development Bank of Southern Africa (DBSA) which explored the best structure of the coordination 
mechanism for South Africa suggested that the structure be flexible to include a tracking facility that would 
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facilitate South Africa’s climate change response (Montmasson-Clair, 2013). However, South Africa does not 
have a clear strategy for climate finance tracking and this is a matter of concern. Climate finance is not 
explicitly included in the priority outcome area of the Department of Performance, Monitoring and Evaluation 
(DPME). There is also no centralised management of donor funding. Provinces and government departments 
receive individual funding for climate change related projects and manage these at their respective tier of 
governance. Only funds obtained through the Global Environmental Facility (GEF) are managed centrally by 
the Department of Environmental Affairs.  
 
South Africa has taken a very diverse approach to climate change inclusive of research, policies, strategies, 
action plans and legislation. However, the lack of knowledge has resulted in duplication of work and wasting 
of resources that have slowed implementation of climate change projects (Dlamini, 2009). There have been 
attempts to build a database to record all funding information for climate change funding. In 2008/2009, the 
National Climate Change Response Database (NCCRD) was established. Information on this database 
includes description, timelines, budgets, target group, and the funding organisation of climate finance. This 
attempt was unsuccessful because financiers are often reluctant to provide the required information 
(Montmasson-Clair, 2013).  
 
6. Climate Change Mitigation and Adaptation in eThekwini Municipality, South 
Africa 
Although poor countries are the most affected by the consequences of climate change, developed countries 
produce most of the GHG emissions that causes climate change. To adapt to changing climatic conditions, 
cities in developing countries have the opportunity to utilise an integrated approach to tackling pressing 
issues, such as an ecosystems-based adaptation model. The Community Ecosystem-Based Adaptation 
(CEBA) is a system where green collar workers are used to implement climate change projects and they 
benefit both financially and through the ecosystems services. Well-functioning ecosystems have been 
identified as the most effective buffering against the impacts of climate change (Taylor, et al., 2014). 
EThekwini municipality is working in the holistic framework of CEBA, and creates various co-partnered 
projects which attempt to work with local communities in natural habitat restoration projects within their area 
(Roberts et al., 2012). The municipality has had flexibility in designing some of these projects, some specific 
projects are taking a “learn-by-doing” tactic. This flexibility allows officials to partner with local organisations 
and people on an iterative design and incremental change process as they make interventions relevant to 
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local communities involved (Roberts et al., 2012). In other words, the project team goes out, tests and adjusts 
through an ongoing improvement design to see what works best in the community. The CEBA have 
complementary socio-economic aspects of nature, communities and local citizenry, and together, the theories 
can help to provide guidance in evaluating complex projects. These approaches can also work together to 
clarify the concept of poverty reduction co-benefits, which essentially places a pro-poor perspective in the 
forefront within the integrated multi-dimensional approach.The benefits of this relationship can contribute 
towards what is called the “Green Economy” (eThekwini Municipality, 2011).  
 
Like other cities in developing countries, eThekwini Municipality is highly vulnerable to climate change. The 
Municipality’s vulnerability is further exacerbated by environmental injustice stemming from apartheid laws, 
high levels of poverty and inequality as well as extensive reliance on the natural ecosystems for survival. The 
eThekwini Municipality has implemented numerous projects in the name of climate change 
adaptation/mitigation. In the process of trying to co-ordinate the work that is being implemented by different 
departments and structures within the Municipality, the climate change learning exchange was born 
(Nzimande & Botes, 2014). The learning exchange aimed to facilitate the exchange of ideas on challenges 
and successes of climate change initiatives. The municipality also works towards forming partnerships with 
non-governmental organisations (NGOs), academia and businesses in order to access data, human capacity, 
funding, and political leaders who could provide much needed political support (Nzimande & Botes, 2014).   
 
Climate change may not have been a priority for eThekwini Municipality in the 1990s, but this has changed 
with the establishment of the Environmental Planning and Climate Protection Department (EPCPD). This 
office has made use of global climate change knowledge networks, academics and experiences in the design 
and implementation of its climate change projects (Taylor et al., 2014). The energy office and the EPCPD 
have developed a climate adaptation and mitigation strategy as part of the plan by the EPCPD to collaborate 
with other departments interested in the climate change agenda. The eThekwini municipality has adopted a 
‘no regrets’ stance on climate change adaptation. In this approach, the vulnerability risks from climate change 
are reduced even if the impacts of climate change do not become as severe as they may have been predicted 
(Taylor et al., 2014). Under the latest municipal programme, greater emphasis has been placed on 
understanding the socio-economic effects or co-benefits from projects which promote the enhancement of 
biodiversity and ecosystems. It would thereby be timely to take stock of the measures or indicators of socio-
economic changes within such initiatives, and specifically understand how climate adaptation programmes 
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have changed the behaviour of local communities and their respective members who are directly involved 
with interventions. The approach encourages diversity in climate change projects.  
 
Over the years, eThekwini Municipality has implemented various climate change projects (see Table 2). 
Among the older projects (up to 2011), they include the Greening of Moses Mabhida stadium and its precinct 
for the 2010 soccer World Cup at the cost of 6.6 million ZAR. Other training stadia including the King 
Zwelithini, Princess Magogo and Sugar Ray Xulu stadia were also ‘greened’ at the cost of 4.3 million ZAR 
(eThekwini Municipality, 2011). Added to the foregoing was the implementation of the Smart City project for 
the COP17 at the cost of 5.8 million ZAR. The initial list of climate change projects are listed in Table 23. 
 
Table 2: Some Climate Change Mitigation/Adaptation Initiatives in eThekwini Municipality 
Project title Aim  Cost by year 2011 
(in ZAR) 
The Buffelsdraai Reforestation 
Project 
The mitigation of the carbon footprint of the 2010 
FIFA World Cup 
13.00 million 
The Inanda Mountain 
Reforestation Project 
An offsetting and adaptation initiative to restore 
vital ecosystem goods and services 
4.10 million 
The Paradise Valley reforestation 
Project 
An offsetting and adaptation initiative to restore 
vital ecosystem goods and services 
3.30 million  
The Durban Metropolitan Open 
Space System (D’MOSS) project 
This project was aimed at protecting the municipal 
biodiversity resources and ecosystems services 
as supported by CEBA 
3.99 million 
eThekwini Municipality Systematic 
Conservation Plan 
The improved resilience of D’MOSS to climate 
change by minimizing habitat and ecological 




Non-user Conservation Servitudes 
(NUCS) 
The offer of tax relief to privately owned land that 
is being managed and conserved appropriately  
None 
Working for ecosystems  The control of invasive alien plants using an 
expanded public works model; the initial project is 
operating in four wards 
3.50 million 
Working on fire Alien invasive plant and fire control in grassland 
areas that are not receiving management  
5.00 million 
Invasive alien plant (IAP) Control The proper coordination and prioritisation 
regarding control and management of IAS in the 
city  
9.00 million 
Source: Adapted from eThekwini Municipality Report (2011) 
 
                                                          
3 For full list see Appendix1. 
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The climate change projects in eThekwini Municipality have been funded from multiple sources including 
donations from Danish funding agency, Danida, the Rockefeller Foundation, the city of Bremen and carbon 
offset funding from the FIFA 2010 World Cup and COP17/CMP7. Funding dedicated to climate change 
became available only in 2010/11 (Taylor et al., 2014). 
 
6.1. Challenges for the eThekwini Municipality in Relation to Climate Change 
Mitigation and Adaptation 
There have been many challenges faced by municipalities such as eThekwini in relation to climate change 
mitigation and adaptation. One of the challenges has been the fact that it has been difficult to distinguish the 
impacts of climate change interventions from other attempts at improving urban management and social and 
economic development. For a project to be considered climate change related, it “has to in some deliberate 
and demonstrable way be a departure from decision making and operational practices that do not consider 
and account for long-term human-induced instabilities in the climate system” (Taylor et al., 2014:17).  
However, some projects in eThekwini Municipality that are presented above as climate change projects may 
not necessarily meet this criterion. 
 
Taylor et al. (2014) note that there has been a lack of support from political leadership for climate change 
mitigation and adaptation projects. Taylor et al. (2014: 31) further argue that “there is, no formal party position 
on issues like climate mitigation or climate adaptation. Even the recent four-yearly ANC party conference, 
where new policy positions were aired, totally ignored climate change as a development concern”. This lack 
of political will have implications in terms of the amount of the city’s budget that is dedicated to climate change 
projects. Despite the lack of support from political leadership, climate change mitigation and adaptation has 
received considerable support from some middle management including eThekwini Mayor and officials with 
scientific backgrounds. However, Taylor et al. (2014) highlight the existence of a blurry line between the 
workings of the political leadership and the state (municipality) that resulted in the climate change agenda 
becoming affected by power struggles between political leadership and middle management.  
 
A third challenge is the lack of internal skills at the municipal level. This has created extensive reliance on 
consultants for the design, implementation, monitoring and evaluation of climate change projects (Taylor et 
al., 2014). The extensive financial resources committed to consultancy possess additional financial 
constraints to the already limited funds available for climate change initiatives in eThekwini. One way to 
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reduce these might be to gradually increase the capacity of departments within the municipality, such as 
Public Works, to manage ‘green jobs’ directly either in an existing programme or division – waste services or 
parks – or programme – such as the extended public works programme.  
 
7. Conclusion 
There is agreement that climate change is a reality that requires urgent attention through mitigation and 
adaptation strategies. However, there are clearly many concerns regarding climate change financing that 
require further attention. Issues range from whether or not climate finance should form part of ODA, how 
funds should be distributed and who climate change initiatives should benefit. These issues could hamper 
the implementation of many useful strategies and much-needed finance could end up funding projects that 
are not for public benefit since there is this absence of criteria that projects need to meet in order to qualify 
as a climate change initiative. The lack of explicit requirements for projects to provide co-benefits to 
communities remains an unsettling problem. Much still needs to be done to setup identifying criteria and 
measurement frameworks to help with issues of transparency, accountability and tracking of climate finance. 
This is especially needed in developing countries in order to curtail the misuse of climate funds in all tiers of 
government. There is also an urgent need to create a system that will govern, prescribe and monitor the use 
of climate funds for the betterment of the eco-systems and the human race as a whole. Furthermore, there 
is a need to develop and implement some form of penalty for non-compliance with the terms of climate 
change finance. In addition, there is an urgent need to explore other approaches to climate change adaptation 
and mitigation beyond the current financialised paradigm.  
 
It was mentioned above that the divide between what is ‘adaptation’ and what is ‘mitigation’ remains 
somewhat blurred. A recent theoretical contribution by Braun may assist here in that he sees both as part of 
an over-arching ’eco-cybernetic’ type of management adopted by cities both internally and in relation to the 
global system, in the face of climate change (2014:50). The relationship between the ‘city’ and the ‘globe’ 
provides for complex feedback loops, such that for cities (he is writing more about the global North, but we 
think it equally might apply to eThekwini):  
 
“what differentiates mitigation and adaptation is simply where in these complex feedback loops ‘government’ 




In this new changing biopolitics mitigation seeks change to the upward contributory causation, while 
adaptation seeks change to the downward, consequential causation: 
 
“One seeks either to realise effects on the first part of this global loop (the effects of urban life on global climate 
such as through fuel consumption meters) or to produce effects on the second part (the effects of climate 
change on urban life, such as through the design of ‘critical’ infrastructure)” (Braun, 2014: 50. Emphasis in 
original). 
 
In eThekwini Municipality, global knowledge and practice are widespread, while work from eThekwini 
contributes to the formation of global best practice, thus problematising any hierarchical organisation of scale 
in climate-related activities. In consequence, any future classification of climate finance will need to be 
cognisant that the dispositif of climate action in the everyday life of projects, programmes and activities in 
eThekwini confounds any easy definition of mitigation being pursued by the private sector with leveraged 
funds, as compared with adaptation for the public good using public revenues in councils. Both are inter-
mingled and entrained together. 
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eThekwini Municipality Climate Change projects (2011) 
Project title           Description Cost by year 2011 
1. The Buffelsdraai Reforestation 
Project 
To mitigate the carbon footprint of the 2010 FIFA 
World Cup. 
R13.00 million 
2. The Inanda Mountain 
Reforestation Project 
An offsetting and adaptation initiative to restore 
vital ecosystem goods and services. 
R4.10 million 
3. The Paradise Valley 
reforestation Project 
An offsetting and adaptation initiative to restore 
vital ecosystem goods and services. 
R3.30 million  
4. The Durban Metropolitan Open 
Space System (D’MOSS) project 
This project was aimed at protecting the municipal 
biodiversity resources and ecosystems services 
as supported by CEBA. 
R3.99 million 
5. EThekwini Municipality 
Systematic Conservation Plan 
Aim: to improve the resilience of D’MOSS to 
climate change by minimizing habitat and 
ecological biodiversity loss and reduce the lack of 
connectivity. 
 R100,000 
6. Non-user Conservation 
Servitudes (NUCS) 
Offers tax relief to privately owned land that is 
being managed and conserved appropriately.  
None 
7. Working for ecosystems  To control invasive alien plants using an expanded 
public works model, this project is operating in 4 
wards. 
R3.50 million 
8. Working on Fire Alien invasive plant and fire control in grassland 
areas that are not receiving management.  
R5.00 million 
9. Invasive alien plant (IAP) 
Control 
To ensure good coordination and prioritization 
regarding control and management of IAS in the 
city.  
R9.00 million 
10. Sihlanzimvelo Project An integrated, systematic and sustainable 
approach to the maintenance of the 800 km of 
watercourses in eThekwini Municipality. The 
purpose is to ensure that all watercourses are 
restored to, and maintained at an appropriate 
environmental standard, thus safeguarding local 
communities. 
R15.00 million per 
year for 3 years 
11. Design Flood line Planning Storm water pipe and culvert designs are being 
adjusted to accommodate the predicted increase 
in rainfall and stream flow intensities. Flood lines 
are being revised to accommodate this increase in 
order to ensure that new developments in or 
adjacent to rivers are not negatively impacted. 
R 830,000 
operational budget for 
2011/12, this work is 
ongoing as budget 
allows 
12. Sea Level Rise Assessment A number of sea level rise scenarios (30, 60 and 
100 cm) were developed using both downscaled 
global climate and semi-empirical models. These 
were used with wave run-up and shoreline 
regression models to determine possible future 
shoreline positions. Along portions of the coast the 




slip failure zones associated with steep dune 
systems were also mapped. 
13. Durban Central Beachfront 
Dune Rehabilitation 
This project involves the augmentation and 
protection of existing dunes, where possible, 
through the extension of frontal dune zones and 
erection of sacrificial fencing and timber board 
walks and the planting of indigenous dune plants.  
R 6.00 million capital 
expenditure and R 
1.50 million per 
annum operating 
expenditure 
14. Sliding Scale of Tariffs A basic amount of water (9 kl) is provided free of 
charge to make water available to poor families in 
an economically sustainable way (i.e. via cross 
subsidisation). 
No direct costs to the 
municipality excluding 
staff time 
15. Non-Revenue Water 
Reduction: Water Pressure 
Management Programme 
This programme involves the installation of new 
pressure management devices, the optimisation 
of the settings on existing valves and the 
optimisation of existing pressure reducing valves 
using time or flow control. 
± R 20.00 million per 
annum 
16. Community Adaptation Plans 
(CAPs) 
1) Aimed at understanding how climate change 
impacts exacerbate daily challenges and risks 
faced by vulnerable communities. 
2) An assessment of climate change impacts upon 
maize, including an investigation into the 
productivity of alternative staple crops under 
climate change conditions and their social 
acceptability. 
3) Research into water harvesting options and the 
undertaking of a local level project focusing on 
water harvesting, water-wise landscaping and the 
improvement of a community garden were 
initiated at a school in Luganda. 
R 2.50 million 
17. Luganda School Water 
Harvesting and Micro Agricultural 
Water Management 
Technology 
The project involves harvesting roof (clean) water 
from classroom roofs and surface (grey) water 
from school grounds into two separate storage 
tank systems. 
R 350,000 
18. Durban Green Corridor To rehabilitate and manage the open spaces of 
the uMngeni River catchment and to promote 
adventure sports, nature-based recreation and 
eco-tourism in a corridor linking the Drakensberg 
Mountains to Durban, thus forming the basis in the 
development of a greener economy. 
R 4,5 million (in 
addition to R 3 million 
from external 
partners) to date 
19. Wind Resource Map The eThekwini Energy Office has developed a 
municipal map highlighting wind power generation 
potential. The study identified 10 sites for further 
investigation for the development of 
20 mW wind farms. 
R 200,000 
20. Municipal Adaptation Plans 
Cost-Benefit Analysis 
To further prioritise interventions in terms of 
implementation, an innovative cost-benefit 
R 1.45 million 
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analysis is being undertaken whereby the number 
of people benefiting from an intervention is used 
to assess priority instead of the usual financial 
metrics.  
21. Integrated Assessment Tool 
for Climate Change Adaptation 
This project involved a detailed analysis of 
multiple sector impacts (using downscaled 
temperature and rainfall projections) and the 
development of a standalone software platform for 
the spatial display and interrogation of sector 
impact modules. 
R 4.21 million 
22. Low Carbon Durban Research 
Project 
The Low Carbon Durban Research Project utilised 
the expertise of prominent scientists from 
the Academy of Science of South Africa and other 
international scientists to develop a Low 
Carbon Durban Report to assist Durban’s 
transition to a low carbon city. 
R 2.10 million 
23. Disaster Operation Centre The Municipal Disaster Management Centre was 
activated on 1st June 2010. This centre co-
ordinates risk management and disaster response 
throughout the municipality. Coordination 
capability has been enhanced by the installation 
of 240 CCTV cameras, as well as a mobile 
camera. 
R 42.00 million 
24. Establishment of eThekwini 
Municipality’s Energy Office 
Using DANIDA funding, eThekwini Municipality 
embarked on a concerted energy efficiency drive, 
which resulted in the establishment of the Energy 
Office in 2008 and the finalisation of the eThekwini 
Energy Strategy in February 2009. In January 
2010, the eThekwini Council adopted eThekwini 
Energy Strategy, which clearly articulated the 
mandate and responsibility of the Energy Office. 
As a result the Energy Office now initiates key 
strategic energy interventions in the Residential 
Sector, Local Authority and Public Sector, 
Industry, Commerce and Agribusiness Sector and 
the Transport sector. 
R 2.40 million to 
establish the office; R 
5.57 million per 
annum 
25. Establishment of eThekwini 
Municipality’s Climate Protection 
Branch 
The work undertaken by the branch that was 
established in 2007has contributed towards 
Durban being considered a global leader in 
climate change adaptation through the 
implementation of novel and innovative work 
streams focused on community, municipal and 
ecosystem-based adaptation. 
Approximately R1.00 
million per annum 
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26. EThekwini Metro Connect MetroConnect is a layer 2 VPN municipal next 
generation fibre network spanning eThekwini 
Municipality. It provides e-government services to 
both its internal stakeholders and to Durban’s 
residents, making Durban a true digital city. 
None  stated  
27. Durban Botanic Gardens: A 
Climate Change and Biodiversity 
Awareness Centre of Excellence 
A number of awareness raising initiatives have 
been developed at the Durban Botanic Gardens. 
These informative and interactive displays 
address issues related to climate change, 
including the value of biodiversity, water 
conservation, food security and renewable 
energy. Projects include: The Renewable Energy 
Project (budget =R 300,000) where two large solar 
panel arrays have been installed and connected 
to the Visitors Complex power supply. 
None Stated 
28. Integrated Rapid Public 
Transport Network (IRPTN) 
The development an extensive and inclusive 
public transport network plan which will ultimately 
allow residents easy access and mobility 
throughout the municipal area. A part of this 
network is already in place – the People Mover 
system of buses covers the entire central business 
district and is a cost-effective and reliable way of 
travelling within the city centre. 
Not yet finalised, but 
billions of Rands 
during first phase 
29. Electric Bicycles Pilot Three electric bicycles were purchased by 
eThekwini Municipality in 2010 in order to 
establish if they were a suitable a mode of 
transport for any of the various transport 
requirements of the municipality. The three 
bicycles were rotated amongst a variety of staff 
and departments. 
Reports and interviews were completed with users 
to determine potential applications of electric 
bikes within the municipality. 
R 18,000 
30. Non-motorised Transport 
Green Circuit and Key Building 
Connections: Phase 1 
This project involves the provision of cycling 
infrastructure and lanes to connect natural 
environmental resources and key city 
infrastructure in the Durban central business 
district. This includes the widening of the bridge 
across the uMngeni Estuary on the M4 route. 
R 23.00 million 
31. Priority Zone Facilities 
Management 
The project is a pilot programme aimed at 
developing a Proficient Integrated Urban Realm 
Management Model that could be replicated 
across the municipality in key strategic or 
economic nodes. The vision of this architectural 
and urban management product is to create a 
holistically healthy urban environment for all 




residents of Durban. This includes a city that is 
efficient and responsive, that attracts property 
investments and tourism, and that creates 
opportunities for its residents whilst always 
meeting their needs. 
32. Green Roof Pilot Project The green roof pilot project commenced in 2008 
and is ongoing. The roof is vegetated with locally 
indigenous species to attract biodiversity. The 
temperature reduction and storm water 
attenuation benefits of the roof are being 
monitored and this knowledge is being used to 
promote the usage of green roof technologies 
throughout Durban through the development of a 
green-roof guideline document. 
R 1.60 million to date 
33. EThekwini Water & Sanitation 
(EWS) Customer Service Centre 
In the new EWS building, ground water from below 
the parking basement floor, rainwater from the 
roof and condensate from the air conditioning 
units is collected in rainwater tanks and used for 
toilet flushing and to water plants. 
R 24.00 million 
34. South Durban Basin (SDB) 
Biodiversity and Greening 
Programme and Recycling Pilot 
Project 
A general improvement of the SDB included the 
upgrading of green areas around the school using 
indigenous plants, the development of a 
permaculture garden, use of rainwater harvesting 
tanks, education and awareness and a reduction 
in the amount of recyclable waste that goes to 
landfill sites through recycling initiatives. 
R 200,000 
35. COP17/CMP7 Concentrated 
Photovoltaic (CPV) Solar Project 
Installation of a 500 kW concentrated solar 
photovoltaic dual axis tracking system in 
eThekwini Municipality. This is the largest Solar 
CPV installation in South Africa and is being 
implemented as a showcase for COP17/CMP7. 
The project also has a focus on skills transfer to 
municipal staff and public awareness-raising 
during the COP17/CMP7 event. 
R30.00 million capital 
investment 
36. Wonderbag™ Residential 
Cooking Efficiency Programme 
The Wonderbag™ is a heat-retention/insulation 
cooker. EThekwini Municipality is currently piloting 
3,500 Wonderbags™ in the Chesterville area, 
prior to implementation throughout the city. The 
Wonderbag™ saves approximately 0.5 tonnes of 
carbon per year if used 2 or 3 times per week. This 
heat-retention cooker is South Africa’s first 
programmatic CDM project and is being registered 




37. Community Renewable 
Energy Projects 
In the Durban Market, a high energy lighting 
system was replaced with a low energy system 
resulting in a 38 kWh reduction in energy 
consumption. A solar PV unit and a wind turbine 
were installed at the Alice Street Bus Depot and 
Thusong Centres and provide 31 and 100 kWh, 
respectively, of renewable energy daily. At the 
Claremont Taxi Rank a solar PV unit was installed 
and provides 23 kWh of renewable energy daily 








Claremont Taxi Rank, 
R689,000 
38. Low Cost Solar Water Heater 
(SWH) Programme 
Eight thousand, three hundred and four 100 L 
capacity solar water heaters were installed on 
roofs of low cost houses within eThekwini 
Municipality from January to June 2011. The solar 
water heaters were provided to registered owners 
of low cost houses free of charge. 
The programme was 
fully funded by an 
ESKOM subsidy for 
low pressure 
SWH units (90% of 
cost) and Carbon 
Credits through the 
Clean Development 
Mechanism (10% of 
costs) 
39. Shisa Solar Programme The Shisa Solar programme aims to promote 
energy efficient solar water heaters (SWH) 
throughout Durban. The Neighbourhood 
Programme targets the middle to high income 
market segment. A key barrier to solar water 
heater uptake in South Africa is the price of 
individual SWH units. EThekwini Municipality has 
therefore developed a program that will allow 
participants to pay less for SWHs, through a 
“volume purchasing” system. 
R 1.00 million 
40. KwaDabeka Hostel Hot Water 
Pilot 
Approximately 25% have geysers for hot water, 
while most residents at the KwaDabeka hostel use 
kettles and two plate stoves to heat water for 
bathing and washing, resulting in high monthly 
electricity usage in many hostels. In this pilot 
project an industrial sized solar water heater was 
installed on one floor of the KwaDabeka Hostel to 
determine the viability of a renewable energy 
solution to this problem. 
R 190,000 
41. Energy Efficiency Demand 
Side Management 
The Division of Revenue Act (DoRA) Energy 
Efficiency Demand Side Management (EEDSM) 
fund from the National Treasury has been made 
available to municipalities over a three year 
period. In Durban during 2009-2010 the project 
focused almost exclusively on traffic light 
replacements. In 2010-2011 the project is 
Total grant allocation 




focussing on both traffic lights and office building 
lights. In the 2011-2012 the bulk of the funding will 
be used for building retrofits, specifically in 
community residential units (hostels). 
42. 2010 eThekwini Municipal 
Green House Gas (GHG) 
Inventory 
The purpose of this project is to build on the two 
prior GHG inventories and to catalogue the GHG 
emissions of both eThekwini Municipality and the 
entire community within Durban for 2010. 
R 280,000 
43. KwaZulu-Natal Sustainable 
Energy Forum (KSEF) 
The KSEF meets the need for information 
dissemination, networking, oversight and 
accountability for the governance of this sector. 
The KSEF was established as an independent 
body, with seed funding from both eThekwini 
Municipality’s Energy Office and the United 
Nations Industrial Development Organisation 
(UNIDO). 
Approximately R 
15,000 per month 
44. Towards a Sustainable Pit 
Latrine Management Strategy 
Through LaDePa 
Pit latrine sludge is difficult to handle and contains 
pathogens and detritus, making disposal to landfill 
the only existing option. Sludge, however, also 
contains nutrients and phosphates, a critical but 
scarce terrestrial resource, which is lost through 
landfill disposal. The challenge is to remove 
(economically) the detritus and pathogens from 
the sludge and produce a workable material that 
could be recycled for agricultural use. 
R70.00 million over 3 
years (including pit 
emptying) 
45. Decentralised Wastewater 
Treatment System (DWATS) at 
Newlands-Mashu Agricultural Hub 
DWATS consists of decentralised off-sewer 
wastewater treatment coupled to the promotion of 
urban horticulture via the recovered wastewater. 
The system was designed, constructed and 
operated in order to enable data collection, gain 
experience and to promote the ability to replicate 
this for future applications. 
Construction of the 
plant cost R 2.30 
million, while testing 
and research cost R 
1.15 million for the 
infrastructure to 
facilitate field trials 
and testing of water 
46. Durban Water Recycling Treating domestic wastewater back to near 
potable standard for recycling back to industry, 
thereby reducing demand for potable water. The 
available water can then be used to better service 
city residents and support further development in 
the city. This was the first Public Private 
Partnership in the water sector in South Africa and 
is a unique recycling intervention. 
Privately sourced 
funding 
47. Durban Landfill Gas-to-
Electricity Project 
This project is currently producing 7.5 mWh of 
electricity (6.5 mWh at Bisasar and 1.0 mWh at 
Mariannhill). Both vertical and horizontal wells are 
drilled into the existing waste. Landfill gas is 
extracted and piped to the generation compound, 
Capital: R 110.00 
million; Operating 




where the raw gas is fed as a fuel into spark 
ignition engines. 
This drives generators that produce electricity that 
is fed into the local grid, thus reducing GHG 
emissions by some 20,000 tons per month. 
48. Mariannhill Landfill 
Conservancy 
This project involves the rehabilitation of the 
footprint and buffer zone of the landfill on a 
continual basis using local environmental assets 
such as endemic and indigenous flora and fauna. 
Both the original soil profile and flora was rescued 
and restored by the Plant Rescue Unit (Prunit) 
during the rehabilitation process. These were 
used in other rehabilitation projects in the region, 
thereby minimising the loss of key biodiversity. 
Approximately R 
550,000 per annum 
49. Domestic Orange Bag 
Recycling Programme 
The National Environmental Management Waste 
Act (2008) and the Polokwane Declaration in 
2000 prescribed a 50% reduction in waste to 
landfill by 2012, and zero waste to landfill by 2022. 
Hence, this innovative recycling project, where 
recycling at source eliminates contamination in 
the recycling process. 
R 9.00 million to date 
50. Durban Climate Change 
Partnership (DCCP) 
The DCCP unites diverse sectors, including 
business, industry, government, civil society, 
academia, people with disabilities and the youth in 
addressing the climate change challenge. Seed 
funding was provided by eThekwini Municipality to 
facilitate the formation of this body, which will 
become independently funded and administered 
in the longer term. 
R 800,000 to date 
51. Durban Industry Climate 
Change Partnership Project 
(DICCPP) 
The core focus of the DICCPP has been to provide 
support to eThekwini Municipality’s Energy Office 
to promote implementation of the formally adopted 
Municipal Energy Strategy. 
The DICCPP has also conducted a number of 
climate change response workshops with various 
economic clusters during 2010 and has 
participated in a local climate change partnership 
forged between the National Business Initiative, 
Durban Chamber of Commerce and Industry, 
UNIDO and eThekwini Municipality. 
R 700,000 
52. Sister City Programme 
 
 
All sister city partnerships are based on formal 
cooperation agreements that focus on a number 
of areas of cooperation, and have resulted in the 
following projects: The DWATS system at 
Frasers Informal Settlement is a Public Private 






Research and Development Association 
(BORDA), eThekwini Municipality and Hering. 
53. Greening Moses Mabhida 
Stadium 
Greening the stadium has yielded significant cost 
savings to the municipality, and provided the 
strategic advantage of being able to offer a “green” 
event hosting venue. This includes a 
30% reduction in possible energy consumption 
through energy efficient architectural design, 
technologies and fittings, saving around R 1 
million per annum. There has also been a 74% 
reduction in possible water consumption, saving 
around R 0.70 million per annum. Carbon 
emissions from building the stadium are being 
offset through local reforestation and renewable 
energy interventions. 
R 6.60 million 
54. Greening of Training Stadia 
for the 2010 FIFA World Cup TM 
 
 
A best-fit greening intervention was determined for 
each venue to achieve energy efficiency, water 
conservation, waste management and climate 
protection using funds provided by eThekwini 
Municipality and Danish International 
Development Agency (DANIDA). Water 
conservation is achieved through the use of 
rainwater harvesting, flow restraint valves, 
intelligent pitch irrigation, the hi-tech pitch at 
KwaMashu and dual-flush toilets and tap aerators. 
Energy efficiency is achieved through heat 
pumps, motion detection lighting, daylight timer 
switches and flood control lighting. Environmental 
Management Systems were developed for 
maximum operational efficiency. 
R 4.30 million 
 
 
55. Greening of Training Stadia 
for the 2010 FIFA World Cup TM 
 
A best-fit greening intervention was determined for 
each venue to achieve energy efficiency, 
water conservation, waste management and 
climate protection using funds provided by 
eThekwini Municipality and Danish International 
Development Agency (DANIDA). Water 
conservation is achieved through the use of 
rainwater harvesting, flow restraint valves, 
intelligent pitch irrigation, the hi-tech pitch at 
KwaMashu and dual-flush toilets and tap aerators. 
Energy efficiency is achieved through heat 
pumps, motion detection lighting, daylight timer 
switches and flood control lighting. Environmental 
Management Systems were developed for 
maximum operational efficiency. 




56.  COP17/CMP7 Event 
Greening Programme 
 
This programme aims to reduce the ecological 
impact associated with hosting the COP17/ 
CMP7 event. The core focus areas are carbon-
neutrality, resource- and energy efficiency, 
ecological footprinting, the production of event 
greening guidelines and an awareness campaign 
around responsible accommodation and tourism 
approaches. It has also provided a platform for the 
development of the Community-Ecosystem Based 
Adaptation (CEBA) concept. These interventions 
will have a legacy value at the local, national and 
international level. 
R 5.80 million 
 
 
57. Green Guideline Series 
 
 
The Green Guideline series provides practical 
tools to guide individuals, businesses and 
institutions in living and working more sustainably 
in Durban. They are concise, practical and 
focused documents providing clear information 
about choosing appropriate “green interventions.” 
The series includes Energy Efficiency, Water 
Conservation, Sustainable Waste Management, 





Source: eThekwini Municipality (2011) 
